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I - Introduction
In his recent book, Cities Without Suburbs, former Albequerque mayor David Rusk suggests that
problems relating to poverty will never be solved as long as there are cities surrounded by suburbs
where residents do not have to be financially or socially accountable for the problems occurring in
cities (Rusk, 1993). Thus Mayor Rusk radically suggests that the only way to address poverty
problems is to do away with city and suburban boundaries. In a different kind of radical proposal,
Minnesota state Representative David Bishop has submitted legislation to the state legislature in which
the state would reorganize the state’s 87 counties into 19 larger counties (Whereatt, 1993). What these
two radical proposals have in common is that they would restructure and change the size of local
governments. This is an issue that has a long history: what is the "optimal" or most appropriate size
of local government?
This paper will review many factors affecting the size of local government. These factors include:
current demographic trends and changes in alternative service delivery arrangements, theoretical
schools of thought, evidence on economies of size, whether current local governments are managed
efficiently, and legal and political factors. This research will review many hotly debated questions,
such as:
· Why do local governments seek to annex unincorporated land and population (and why
residents sometimes go along with the plans and other times fiercely resist)?
· Is a consolidated local government more efficient in providing services and better at planning
and zoning, or is it an inefficient monopolistic bureaucracy that seeks to maximize its taxing
and spending powers?
· Could taxes be lowered or services improved by having an efficiently run government?
· How do state laws affect annexation and incorporation activity?
· Why do so many consolidation plans get rejected by voters?
· Is racism a motivating factor behind plans to consolidate cities and suburbs (that is, to dilute
minority political representation)?These are only a few of the questions that this paper will review.
1 - Literature Searched. The goal of this paper is to review the most recent literature on factors
affecting the size of local government. Accordingly, the initial literature search focused on the 1978 -
present period, although many older articles were subsequently incorporated into this paper as
necessary.
1 The literature review focuses primarily on academic sources found in such databases as
PAIS Decade, EconLit, SocSciInd, WorldCat, SocioAbs, NewsAbs, Article1st, and so on.
2 As much
as possible, we avoided the literature on public schools (a major local function) since it would detract
from our focus on general purpose units of government.
2 - Definitions. Many terms will be used repeatedly throughout this paper. We will define these
terms before proceeding.
3
Annexation - An existing community expands its boundaries to include previously unincorporated
land.
Consolidation (merger) - Two or more existing communities join together to form a single
community.
Detachment - Community boundaries are redrawn to exclude some land.
Incorporation - A new community forms on previously unincorporated land.
Municipality - A self-governing town or district.
1 The literature goes back many decades, so we do not claim to do an exhaustive survey. Many of
the debates reviewed in this paper involve older, classic articles and monographs, which had to be located
and read.
2 This literature review does not include special state government and consulting firms’ reports,
although there appear to be many such reports, which are difficult to locate in a systematic way.
3 These definitions are quoted from Epple and Romer (1989), p. 309.
2II - Theoretical Schools of Thought on the Optimal Size of Local Government
The discussion below reviews alternative schools of thought about a host of issues that center around
the normative question of what the optimal size of government "should" be. The debate has been very
lively, to say the least, if not bitter and acrimonious.
1 - Traditional Reform School. The earliest school of thought is sometimes referred to as the
"Traditional," "Reform," or "Traditional Reform" school of thought. It has been given this designation
since it has been around for nearly a century and its advocates have sought to reform, among other
things, the seemingly natural tendency of American cities to create suburbs, which leads to so-called
"fragmented" government (e.g., Studenski, 1930; Jones, 1942).
4 White (1975) and Baker, Ostrom,
and Goehlert (1979) have compiled annotated bibliographies of this school of thought.
Two reports by the Committee for Economic Development (1966, 1970) are frequently cited in the
literature. The following statements are representative of the reports:
"The structure of government in metropolitan areas has a profound impact on the daily lives
of metropolitan citizens. But, as this Committee has long recognized, the present
arrangement of overlapping local units is not serving the people well. Citizens in
metropolitan areas are confronted by a confusing maze of many -- possibly a dozen --
jurisdictions, each with its own bureaucratic labyrinth. This baffling array of local units has
made it difficult for citizens -- the disadvantaged particularly -- to gain access to public
services and to acquire a voice in decision-making." (Reshaping Government in Metropolitan
Areas, p. 10).
"The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping local jurisdictions
cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs.
The fiscal effects of duplicative suburban separatism create great difficulties in provision of
costly central city services benefitting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are to
function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size and authority to
plan, administer, and provide significant financial support for solutions to area-wide
4 The reform movement primarily sought to avoid local party "machine" politics. Therefore, the three
main reform goals were: 1) adopting a council-manager form of government; 2) adopting nonpartisan at-
large elections; and 3) creating shorter and less-confusing ballots (Bingham and Hedge, 1991).
3problems." (Modernizing Local Government,p .4 4 )
Fields (1983, p. 23) has nicely summarized five of the main propositions favoring consolidated local
government:
1. A consolidated government is more efficient and effective than several smaller governments.
Costs can be held down and perhaps reduced through the elimination of duplicative services,
personnel, and equipment. Further, the larger unit may be able to take advantage of
"economies of scale" or lower per-unit costs of government services.
2. Consolidation helps eliminates spillovers or externalities. Many government services benefit
citizens in adjoining areas who neither pay for the service nor share in the effort involved in
its delivery. These "spillovers" are eliminated if the taxing jurisdiction is coterminous with
the service jurisdiction. While the complete elimination of spillovers is probably impossible,
the larger jurisdiction is better able to avoid the problem than are several smaller ones.
3. The environment for decision making and long-range planning is improved. A single
government in an area is better able to coordinate policies and decisions than are several
governments.
4. Consolidated governments, with only one governing body, are easier for the citizens to
understand and use. Decision making and service responsibilities are more clearly defined
and understood.
5. Consolidation matches area needs with area resources. Tax burdens within a community are
equalized through the creation of a government that more clearly corresponds to area needs.
2 - Public Choice School. The Traditional Reform school of thought has come under attack ever since
the highly influential article published by Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure"
(Tiebout, 1956).
5 In this article, Tiebout defended the status quo tendency towards "fragmentation"
on the grounds that consolidated government is analogous to an economic monopoly that can exploit
rents, whereas "fragmentation" is analogous to a perfectly competitive economic model that forces
local governments to keep taxes low, provide efficient services, and allow individuals to express their
preferences for different levels of government services by "voting with their feet." This theme has
5 It is an interesting irony that the Traditional Reform school seems to have lost its popularity in the
1960’s as liberal groups became very dissatisfied with the unresponsiveness of large governments in major
urban areas and demanded more local (neighborhood) autonomy. Naturally, the Public Choice school has
since benefitted from this dissatisfaction. Bish and Ostrom (1973) divide the reform movement into two
classes: the Old Reform Tradition (Consolidation) and New Reform Tradition (Community Control).
4since been developed by many researchers.
Perhaps one of the better theoretical explanations of the Public Choice view is provided by Ostrom,
Tiebout, and Warren (1961). They first discussed the nature of public goods, including the problems
of externalities ("spillover effects") and excludability ("packageability"). They also made the important
distinction between directly producing and providing local governmental service (the latter means
being responsible for services, which allows for interlocal governmental or private sector contracts).
Providing local governmental service allows the government to separate supply and demand functions
and eliminate inherent problems when a local agency is responsible for both functions.
6 They argue
that there are trade-offs between competing criteria for appropriate government size: control,
efficiency, political representation, and local self-determination. They believed that consolidated
governments may be effective in providing some large scale services, but ineffective in providing other
services that are more conducive to smaller units. For local governments to internalize externalities,
they argued that different services may require different boundaries, which may appear to be "chaotic"
but economically effective. Alternatively, externalities may be cooperatively addressed through
regional governments.
The last 3 decades have seen a proliferation of Public Choice literature testing various aspects of this
theory. For example, an important and recurring empirical question is whether multiple governments
keep per capita taxes and expenditures down, or conversely, does a consolidated government act
monopolistically and raise per capita taxes and expenditures? Since 1985, 4 studies have examined
this issue of the "Leviathan," with the results inconclusive.
7 The Leviathan hypothesis posits that
6 The authors elaborated on the benefits from the groundbreaking and now famous contract for
services between Lakewood, California and Los Angeles County, which began in 1954.
7 The Public Choice literature hypothesizes that bureaucrats seek to maximize their budgets and hence
their power, perhaps insatiably. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) referred to large government as
"Gargantua," while Brennan and Buchanan (1977) re-popularized the phrase "Leviathan," a reference to
Machiavelli’s classic treatise on the nature of political power.
5there is a negative relationship between the number of competing local governments and the level of
government expenditures. Oates (1985), who used both domestic and international data, and Forbes
and Zampelli (1989), who used county level data, did not find any support for this hypothesis. On the
other hand, Zax (1989), who used county level data, and Eberts and Gronberg (1990), who used
metropolitan level data, did find support for the Leviathan hypothesis.
8
In an effort to refute Public Choice theory, Lyons and Lowery (1989) challenged five Public Choice
propositions. Kentucky residents were directly surveyed in Louisville-Jefferson County and
Lexington-Fayette County, two metropolitan areas with very similar size and attributes. An important
difference between the two areas is that Louisville-Jefferson County represents a typical "fragmented"
region, while Lexington-Fayette County represents a consolidated government (the city of Lexington
and Fayette County had consolidated 15 years earlier). This represented an ideal setting to poll
residents directly and check for statistically significant differences in sample means between the two
populations on important questions. Lyons and Lowery found that: 1) residents in small governments
were not better informed about local taxes and services than residents from the consolidated
government; 2) residents in small governments did not feel that their local officials were responsive to
their needs; 3) residents in small governments were not more likely to participate in local government;
4) residents in small governments were not more satisfied with local services and local officials than
residents in consolidated government; and 5) there is not a widely dispersed level of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction among residents in small governments (who continually "vote with their feet")
compared to a consolidated region. The authors concede that this is only one study, which may be
unique to Kentucky. Nonetheless, these relatively recent findings provide an interesting challenge to
Public Choice theory.
8 While economists have approached the Leviathan hypothesis through strictly governmental size and
tax considerations, political scientists have also addressed this topic with consideration given to
demographics, governmental structure, and functional responsibilities (see, for example, Lineberry and
Fowler (1967), Dye and Garcia (1978), and Stein (1982)).
63 - Neo-Marxist School. The Neo-Marxist school of thought is less interested in determining what the
optimal size of local government should be and more interested in explaining patterns of local
governmental decision-making as it relates to local economic development.
Markusen (1976) and Cox and Nartowicz (1980) have stimulated much new research. After reviewing
the similarities between the Traditional Reform ("liberal") and Public Choice schools (for example,
concerns over unchecked government power), Cox and Nartowicz make the observation:
Yet from another angle what strikes one is not so much the differences between public
choice theorists and their liberal antagonists...Rather it is the broad similarities of assumption
that circumscribe their vision. Both public choice theory and liberal theory accept that
consumption is the basic issue...In contrast a radical perspective attempts to situate
institutional forms, such as the decentralization of local governments, with respect to modes
of production and to the contradictions consequent to the reproduction and development of
modes of production. Production rather than consumption becomes a focus and private
property becomes a juridical relation subject to explanation rather than to mere assumption.
(pp. 201-202)
Thus Cox and Nartowicz contend that business interests (particularly the "property capitals") seek to
reproduce themselves by pressuring local governments to develop public infrastructure, which to some
extent helps to explain the decentralization or fragmentation of local governments, since business
leaders can play local governments off against each other.
Fleischmann (1986a, 1986b) has recently tested the claims of the Public Choice and Neo-Marxist
schools regarding annexation. He found that a new paradigm needs to be formulated synthesizing
these two models, since neither model is completely satisfactory in explaining observed behavior. He
argued that the Public Choice school focuses too much on the consumer behavior of residents who
"vote with their feet" and ignores the producer sector, while the Neo-Marxist school focuses too much
on the producer sector and tends to ignore the role of consumers.
III - Current Demographic Trends and Changes in Local Government Structure
71 - Growth in Annexations, Incorporations, and Detachments. Most of the population growth in the
last decade in the United States has taken place in the South and the West. According to the 1992
United States Statistical Abstract, over the 1980-1990 decade, the Northeast region grew 3.4 percent,
the Midwest region grew 1.4 percent, the South grew 13.2 percent, and the West grew 23.9 percent.
Much of the population growth occurred in metropolitan areas, which can be misleading in the sense
that changes in metropolitan population are really due to newly annexed land. Table 1 summarizes
annexation activity by state for the 1980-1989 period as well as detachment activity, which occurs
much less frequently. Not shown are data on incorporation activity, the creation of new cities.
Factors affecting annexation and incorporation activity are the subject of much research, while research
on detachment is limited, with the subject being somewhat of a mystery.
9
2 - Changes in Local Service Delivery. Traditionally, local governments have either directly or
indirectly provided services in education, public safety, public works, public utilities, health and
human services, parks and recreation, cultural programs, and other support functions. However, the
way in which local governments finance and deliver these traditional services has been changing,
especially since the 1980’s when the Reagan Administration changed the way in which the federal
government provides assistance to state and local governments. The 1981 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) combined 57 categorical grant programs into 9 block grants and reduced
the total funding for grants-in-aid. The only grant program area that received increased funding was
transportation.
With the cuts, many local governments came under pressure to cut services, raise taxes, increase user
fees and charges, or provide services more efficiently. To monitor how local governments were
9 We found only two articles on detachment in our literature search. Epple and Romer (1989) were
interested in testing a Public Choice theory of whether boundaries are flexible or not (that is, could a voter
"vote with his/her deed" if he/she is dissatisfied with inefficient local services?). Knaap and Juelich (1992)
were interested in examining the fiscal impact of detachments.
10coping with the cuts, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
and the International City Management Association (ICMA) jointly conducted a mail survey of 3,140
cities and 1,067 counties in 1983 (the response rate was 49.7 percent from cities, 52.7 percent from
counties) (ACIR, 1983).
About 52 percent of cities and counties engaged in intergovernmental service contracts; two-thirds of
these contracts were written contracts, while one-third were unwritten agreements. About 55 percent
of cities and counties engaged in joint service agreements. Most of the contracts and service
agreements were done by large governmental units. The trends for cities showed a surprising decline
in contracts (59 percent in 1972 to 52 percent in 1983), but a sharp increase in joint service
agreements (35 percent to 55 percent). The top 5 contracting areas were for jails, sewage disposal,
animal control, tax assessing, and solid waste disposal; the top 5 joint service agreements were for
libraries, police and fire communications, fire prevention, sewage disposal, and jails. Both for
contracts and service agreements, local officials cited economies of scale as the most important reason
why they entered the arrangements, followed by (in descending order) the need for larger areas,
elimination of duplication, and then lack of facilities.
The ACIR-ICMA survey also attempted to review the laws governing interlocal service contracting
and joint service agreements, which are more difficult to quantify. They found that all 50 states
authorize local jurisdictions to enter into general cooperative ("joint power") agreements; 45 states
specifically authorize intergovernmental contracting for purchasing services ("intergovernmental
contract powers") (up from 30 in the 1974 survey); and 26 states had laws authorizing contracting with
private sector firms.
10
10 It is likely that these trends have continued, so that these numbers are conservative by today’s
standards.
11The ACIR-ICMA survey also looked at the transferring of services from cities and county governments
to other government units, and transferring of services to cities and counties. Cities and counties
showed a decline from 31 percent in 1975 to 25 percent in 1983 in transferring away services. The
most frequently transferred away services were public health, taxation, solid waste collection or
disposal, law enforcement, and transportation.
The ICMA report (1983) also looked at the growth in private sector delivery of public services,
reporting the results of Hatry (1983) and Valente and Manchester (1984). Hatry lists 11 alternatives to
direct public service delivery: contracting out/purchasing of service, franchises, grants and subsidies,
vouchers, volunteers, self-help, use of regulatory and taxing authority, encouragement of private
organizations to take over an activity, "demarketing" to reduce demand for a service, obtaining
temporary help from private firms, and user fees to adjust demand. After making many qualifications
in comparing two somewhat dissimilar surveys (1972 and 1982), the ACIR shows that there appears to
have been an increase in contracting out to the private sector by city governments (in 22 out of 23
categories, the number of cities contracting out for services increased between 1972 and 1982).
Stein (1993) has recently reported the results of a 1988 ICMA survey that was very similar to the
1982 survey. Stein compared the 1982 and 1988 responses of 667 cities for 64 functional activities.
He found that for all cities, direct production and distribution of services had increased slightly from
57 to 60 percent, although for cities over 250,000 the percentage declined from 56 to 46 percent.
Service contracting had declined slightly from 30 to 28 percent, while other alternatives (vouchers,
subsidies, etc.) had remained fairly constant at less than 15 percent.
3 - Trends in Regional Governance. Regional governance plays an important part in Public Choice
theory. Public Choice advocates argue, among other things, that many small governments are more
responsive to voters and are generally more efficient than larger "monopolistic" governments. They
12argue that the issues of externalities and planning can be addressed through regional councils in a
multi-tiered governmental system.
The trends in regional councils has recently been examined by Atkins and Wilson-Gentry (1992) and
Atkins (1993), which are summarized below. Quantitatively, the number of regional councils went
from virtual nonexistence in the 1950’s to a peak of 669 regional councils in 1976; as of 1991, there
were 529 regional councils. At their peak in 1977, 75 percent of their budgets came from the federal
government, whereas in 1988 the federal share was down to 45 percent. The number of federal
programs directly and indirectly involving regional councils numbered 48; today there are only 13
programs from the 1970’s still funded.
To understand these quantitative facts, it is important to understand the changes in the political
environment over the years. Initially, regional council officials were careful not to alienate local
officials who felt threatened by the presence of regional officials. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the power
of regional councils increased as the federal government began to address regional problems and
directly authorized regional councils to implement numerous federal programs. Then in the 1980’s
during the Reagan years, under the banner of eliminating unnecessary multiple layers of government,
Congress passed the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. The responsibility for implementing
these grants has since rested with the states. In the face of decreased federal funding, the states have
funded regional councils in an uneven manner; some councils have ceased functioning altogether. The
evidence shows that most councils have seen their funding levels reduced (resulting in smaller staffs)
and have modified their missions.
Atkins and Wilson-Gentry (1992, p. 466 and p. 485) describe the old and new "etiquette" for regional
council officials. The old etiquette used to be:
· stay with the feds;
· maintain a low profile;
13· provide comprehensive planning assistance only;
· don’t compete with the public sector governments; and
· don’t compete with the private sector businesses.
The new etiquette is:
· go with the states;
· market your agency;
· pick a few things to do well;
· invite competition; and
· be innovative.
IV - Economies of Size Literature
This section directly addresses the fundamental issue posed by the title of the paper: is there an
optimal size of local government? Fox’s (1980) research demonstrates that this is an area with a very
long history, with written reports at least dating to 1902. Researchers have focused on an optimal size
of local government for all services, but recently most researchers have examined whether there is an
optimal size for particular services. This latter approach dovetails with the Public Choice school of
thought, since the Public Choice school argues that if there are economies of size to be exploited for
particular services, then it is better for a local government to contract out for those services than to
merge with another local government, in which all services are provided together (arguably
inefficiently).
The hypothesis of the economies of size literature is that there is a "U" shaped average cost curve.
That is, as services are provided to larger populations, per capita expenditures first decline, reach a
14Highlights from the Fox et al. Annotated Bibliography of the
Economies of Size Literature
Fox et al. (1979) have compiled an annotated bibliography of the optimal size of
government, both in aggregate and by sector. Fox (1980) then analyzed and synthesized
the findings from the initial literature search. It appears that economies of size depend
upon the particular local circumstances, even for the same service. The following section
selectively highlights some of the findings by sector from Fox et al.:
Fire protection. Hitzhusen (1972) found economies of size with populations over 10,000,
while Will (1965) found a U-shaped cost curve with minimum costs at around 300,000.
Police protection. Douglas and Tweeten (1971) found a U-shaped cost curve with a
minimum between 250,000 and 500,000, while Beaton (1974) found economies of size
only for very small cities (600 to 2,000). Ostrom and Parks (1973) found bigger cities
had higher per capita expenditures.
Hospitals. Carr and Feldstein (1967) found a U-shaped cost curve with minimum costs
at 190 beds, while Cohen (1967, 1970) found a minimum between 540 to 790 beds in
one study and a minimum of 160 to 170 beds in another study. On the other hand,
Ingbar, Whitney, and Taylor (1966) did not find any evidence for economies of size and
Lave and Lave (1970) found very slight (if any) economies of size.
Refuse collection. Savas and Stevens (1976) and Stevens (1977, 1978) all found
economies of size up to 50,000, after which costs were constant. Hirsch (1965) and
Kemper and Quigley (1976) did not observe any economies of size, while Kitchen (1976)
found diseconomies until a very large population was reached.
Water and sewer utilities. Cosgrove and Hushak (1972) found economies of size up to
50,000. Bourcier and Forst (1967) and Johnson and Hobgood (1975) found that the
average cost curve was U-shaped, while the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (1964) and Young and Carlson (1975) suggest that the average cost is continually
downward sloping (which is characteristic of economic monopolies).
Electricity. Huettner and Landon (1978) found the average cost curve is U-shaped, while
Johnston (1952) found that the average cost initially declines at small output levels and
then is constant. Barzel (1963), Christensen and Greene (1976), Dhrymes and Kurz
(1964), and Lomax (1952) all found economies of size. Wallace and Junk (1970) found
that small municipalities would have big savings by purchasing power from large systems
rather than producing power themselves.
Roads. Lesher and Mapp (1974) found a U-shaped average cost curve with a minimum
at 465 miles per county, while Swanson (1956) found a continually declining average cost
curve for counties, where the largest county had 600 miles.
15minimum, and then begin to increase again.
11 Most studies have used regression techniques to
identify and estimate the appropriate independent variables, and then estimate the minimum average
cost point (optimal population size). Since the Fox et al. report, there has at least one important article
addressing economies of size. Benton and Gamble (1984) tested the claim of the Traditional Reform
school that consolidation would lead to economies of size so that one could expect lower per capita
taxes and expenditures. In fact, what they found was that both per capita taxes and expenditures
increased after the city-county consolidation of Jacksonville, Florida (one of the few areas for which a
lengthy time-series is available). They attributed this phenomenon to two possible reasons: 1) the
quantity and quality of services increased after the consolidation (this is a point often overlooked in
the theoretical discussions); and 2) the political leaders who lost their jobs as a result of the
consolidation voted big pay increases to local service providers just before they left office in an
apparent move to spite the consolidation.
V - Managerial Approaches to Efficient Local Government Size
Some literature addresses issues of government size from organizational and managerial points of
view. This section looks at some of these approaches.
1-Cost Revenue Analysis. Breen, Costa, and Hendon (1986) approach annexation with a variation of
cost-benefit analysis, cost-revenue analysis. They used Middlefield, Ohio as a real example of how a
town can determine if it should annex a nearby development. Using very specific assumptions and
techniques, they showed that annexation should take place if revenues exceed costs over the long term.
11 Technically, economic textbooks make the distinction between economies of scale and economies
of size, even though the terms are often used interchangeably. Debertin (1987), for example, argues that
economies of scale is defined as a proportionate change in output due to a proportionate change in all
inputs, while economies of size is defined as a proportionate change in output due to a change in a single
input with other inputs held fixed at previous levels. In this study, we believe that "economies of size"
is the more appropriate phrase, since what is usually envisioned is the effect of population size on per
capita expenditures when some unit of capital is held constant.
16The authors argue that the main considerations involved are wanting a new tax base, but not wanting
to get stuck with an unusually high public debt.
In a similar vein, Bunch and Strauss (1992) analyzed nine small towns near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Though not explicitly a cost-revenue analysis, the authors made several realistic assumptions about
each of the nine towns and simulated the effects of a consolidation of some of the towns. They also
altered some of the assumptions to consider how that would affect the outcomes. There are two
interesting features of this study: 1) it looks at consolidation issues for small towns (under 20,000), for
which there is not much literature; and 2) many of the suggested managerial reforms (such as raising
user fees, using volunteer firefighters, etc.) were actually adopted by the towns as a result of the study,
but none of the towns consolidated and continued to incur annual operating fiscal deficits.
2-Managerial Efficiency Assessments. Another managerial issue is whether services are being
provided efficiently. The implication of inefficient service provision is that economies of size may be
mistaken for inefficient service so that decision makers are basing (or have based) their decisions upon
incorrect information. This is the conclusion that Deller and Rudnicki (1992) reached after studying
the Maine school system. The methodology involves a sophisticated "production frontier" approach, in
which local practices are indexed against the most efficient known practices. Deller and Rudnicki
found that there were substantial inefficiencies in the Maine school system.
In a similar study, Deller and Nelson (1991) used a mathematical programming approach to analyze
managerial efficiency in road production. Using 446 observations from Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Illinois, the authors concluded that larger jurisdictions would be more efficient than the current
jurisdictions for the case of road production. Deller and Nelson conclude that local governments
might be better off providing (contracting out) road services rather than producing the services
themselves.
17Regional Coordination as a Development and Planning Strategy. The Traditional Reform advocates
have argued that planning is "easier" or "better" with a large consolidated local government, while
Public Choice advocates have argued that the same benefits can be obtained with a multitier
governmental system that does not sacrifice local autonomy. While the two schools disagree over
which system is best, they do agree that regional planning and coordination may lead to benefits in
economic development.
Carolan (1990) uses environmental planning (a classic example) to discuss the advantages of regional
coordination. Carolan argues that there are five benefits of regional environmental planning:
1) consistent laws; 2) efficient resource management; 3) shared liabilities; 4) increased political power;
and 5) easier public education. A Public Choice advocate would likely agree with the consistency and
liability arguments, debate the efficiency argument, and have no opinion (or a negative opinion) about
the political power and education arguments.
Hawkins, Ward, and Becker (1991) seem to embrace the Public Choice school of thought, yet see no
inconsistency with advocating local government consolidation as an economic development strategy.
They argue consolidation should depend upon local circumstances, but that the benefits may include:
consistent zoning laws, an enhanced image that attracts new investors, wider use of revenue, and
increased financial authority. Consolidation may also make communities available for special grants
and loans. At the very least, the authors argue that local leaders should consider the role of regional
councils of governments. MIS (1992) gives excellent examples of how this approach can work, with
perhaps the most notable example being the attraction of the Diamond-Star Motors (a joint venture of
Chrysler and Mitsubishi) automobile factory to a rural area in Illinois.
Breckenfeld (1982) described a very unusual case where a large corporation, Kellogg, Inc., threatened
to move its corporate headquarters from Battle Creek, Michigan unless Battle Creek City and Battle
18Creek Township consolidated. The corporation argued that it could not attract the employees it
wanted because of the lack of development caused by squabbling between the City and Township.
The consolidation proposal was overwhelmingly passed, but many residents resented the corporation
giving an ultimatum. This appears to be a rare case of a private sector company overtly influencing a
consolidation decision.
VI - Legal Factors Affecting Size of Local Government
An important question is the effect of annexation and consolidation laws upon annexation and
incorporation activity. The interaction between incorporation and annexation activity are opposite
sides of the same coin. Local city governments pursue annexations for reasons that are perceived as
being motivated by a desire to secure a wealthy suburban tax base; incorporations are often undertaken
"defensively" to prevent being taken over by a large city (usually due to a perceived threat from the
suburban perspective). Cities are perceived to have more social problems and require higher taxes
than suburban communities. Many researchers believe easy annexation laws (difficult incorporation
laws) benefit central city governments, while difficult annexation laws (easy incorporation laws)
benefit suburban communities.
Annexations. An early classic article on the effects of the law on annexation activity is by Dye
(1964). Dye subjectively quantified the annexation laws ona1t o1 0scale (1 difficult, 10 easy) for
213 cities and then correlated the laws with annexation activity and other variables. Dye did not find
any correlation between the laws and annexation activity. Dye found that three other variables were
more closely correlated with annexation activity: 1) manager governments (positive relationship); 2)
the degree of a middle class in central cities (negative relationship); and 3) the age of a city (negative
relationship; that is, the older the city, the less likely to annex new land).
19Since the Dye article, there have been at least four important studies on the effects of the law upon
annexation activity, which have yielded somewhat conflicting results. These more recent studies have
relied upon the so-called Sengstock methodology, which has been popular among legal scholars for
some time but only recently used by other social scientists. Sengstock (1960) classified all the states’
annexation laws into 5 categories as explained below:
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1. Legislation Determination (LD). The state legislature, lacking the desire or ability to
delegate such responsibilities, deliberates each annexation proposal.
2. Popular Determination (PD). Annexation decisions are made by local "residents" through
referendum or petition; depending on the statute, "residents may be defined as the municipal
electorate, the owners and inhabitants of the annexed areas, and/or the electorate of the
diminished territory.
3. Municipal Determination (MD). The extension of municipal boundaries through the
unilateral action of local governing bodies.
4. Judicial Determination (JD). The state’s judiciary determines whether or not a proposed
annexation should occur.
5. Quasi-Legislative or Administrative Determination (QL). An independent, non-judicial board
or commission determines whether or not a proposed annexation should occur.
How the 50 states are currently categorized, according to Liner (1990), is shown in Table 2.
MacManus and Thomas (1979) were the first to use this methodology. They examined 243 cities with
populations over 50,000 for the 1970-1973 period and found that there was not a relationship between
the legal classifications and annexation activity. Dusenbury (1980) looked only at southern states and
did not conduct formal statistical tests, but found strong evidence that state laws did affect annexation
activity.
Galloway and Landis (1986) attempted to resolve the conflicting findings of MacManus and Thomas
and Dusenbury. They carefully examined about 61,000 land annexations during the 1970’s as reported
12 This sections quotes from Galloway and Landis (1986).
21in the 1980 U.S. Census, then regressed the dummy variables for the Sengstock classifications on
state-level average annexations. They found that state laws do affect the number of annexations in
both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, but found that the Sengstock classifications were poor
predictors of annexation activity in the sense that total explained variation was low and some of the
signs were not as expected.
13 Liner (1990) attempted to improve the Galloway and Landis results by
using Census data from the 1960’s (which includes data on annexations of land and population),
focusing on cities rather than the states, and by including socioeconomic variables. Although the total
explanatory power of Liner’s models was low, he also found that laws do affect annexation activity
and that the Sengstock classifications were accurate predictors.
Incorporations. Rigos and Spindler (1991) point out that all of the earlier studies on incorporation
(Martin and Wagner (1978), Miller 1981), Hoch (1984) and Waste (1983)) use data on one state only:
California. Martin and Wagner, for example, found that incorporations slowed down after California
adopted a more restrictive incorporation procedure. While California is an important and rapidly
growing state, Rigos and Spindler are correct to point out the general lack of research in this area.
In their study, Rigos and Spindler used incorporation data for 49 states over the 1970-1979 and 1980-
1986 periods, which is collected by the U.S. Census Boundary and Annexation Survey and reported in
the ICMA Municipal Yearbook. They also included in their regression analysis other variables that
they hypothesized to affect incorporation activity. Interestingly, they found that easy annexation laws
were a powerful force explaining defensive incorporations, whereas incorporation laws themselves
were relatively unimportant. They also found that other state variables, such as property tax limits and
the role of county governments, affect the level of incorporation activity.
13 For example, they expected that annexation activity would be greatest in states that are classified
as "MD" (municipalities that can unilaterally annex land) and least in states classified as "PD" (popular
votes determine consolidation outcomes), but this did not occur.
22VII - Political Factors Affecting Size of Local Government
The classic articles in this field are by Marando (1974, 1979). Marando compiled data on
consolidation votes since World War II, which showed that only 17 out of 68 city-county
consolidations, arguably the most comprehensive kind of reform, have passed (these votes are
reproduced in Table 3).
14 To the Public Choice advocates, this is evidence of the Traditional Reform
school’s unpopularity (see, for example, Toma, 1979). Marando documented that these proposals were
often promoted by local "elites" (such as Chambers of Commerce, League of Women Voters, the
academic community, and metropolitan newspapers). Typically, since the proposals are not well-
understood, study commissions are formed, which allows special interest groups time to mobilize and
dispute the supposed benefits. Usually, the voters become confused by the complexity of the issues
and are reluctant to change a situation for which they do not see an urgent problem. Voter turnout has
been very low (usually around 25 percent).
It is important to recognize that the great majority of city-county consolidation votes have taken place
in the South.
15 A recurring allegation is that the city-county consolidation votes are racially
motivated: that is, Caucasians are alleged to favor consolidations as a way to dilute African-American
voting power, which is concentrated in the cities. It should be pointed out also that recent court
decisions have made consolidations more difficult, such as requiring a majority by both city and
county voters and making sure that the Fair Housing Act is not violated. Marando has aptly discussed
how racially motivated consolidations are a double-edged sword:
14 A frequently cited statistic is that no city over 1 million people has ever consolidated with a
county. Miami and Dade County consolidated, but at the time, Miami did not have a population over one
million people.
15 In particular, Virginia has had the most number of votes by far. This is because by Virginia law,
once a town reaches a population of 5,000, it becomes a city and fiscally separates from the county with
the power to annex county properties. This has led to many local initiatives by county leaders, who see
their tax base, population, and political power threatened.
23A further implication drawn from recent Supreme Court Decisions [is] that they create a bind for
individuals who on one hand, favor decentralized governmental structures which facilitate
maintaining segregation in housing and schooling, while on the other hand, favor consolidation to
keep Blacks from gaining political control of the central city (1979, p. 420).
Marando showed that many annexations had taken place and that the number (and authority) of
regional councils of government had increased. However, he considered these actions to be less
sweeping in their reforms than city-county consolidations.
VIII - Conclusions
1-Summary of Findings. The theoretical debate is likely to be contentious for some time to come.
We believe that the Public Choice school seems to have dominated the debate over the last 30 years
and certainly has changed the discussion over reform. The Neo-Marxists have also made a
contribution in getting both schools to focus on business as well as consumer groups. We agree with
the observation given by Wikstrom:
First, we need to recognize that the issue of political consolidation is primarily, although not
exclusively, a political question. Consolidation of governmental units in the metropolis will be
supported by those interests and groups which perceive that their political power will be sustained
or enhanced, while it will be opposed by those who feel politically threatened (p. 6).
As far as demographic trends go, it is fairly clear that the South and Western regions of the country
are growing the fastest in terms of population. It is clear also that local governments are increasingly
willing to try alternative service delivery mechanisms, including contracting with the private sector, as
a way to cope with budget cuts from the 1980’s. It is also evident that the power of regional councils
of government peaked during the 1970’s and that since the 1980’s councils have had to re-define their
missions in response to state funding.
24The economies of size literature seems to indicate that there is no single "optimal" size city (and
therefore governmental service delivery). Rather, the optimal size of governmental service delivery
varies by service and is quite sensitive to local conditions.
In managerial matters, readers interested in efficiency arguments will find that some cost-revenue and
simulation analyses have been conducted regarding annexation and consolidation decisions. Also, new
and sophisticated methodologies have been used to show that local governments are not being run
efficiently; these new methodologies are likely to encounter normal academic criticism, so caution is
advised in interpreting these results. Lastly, it should be pointed out that even some of the Public
Choice advocates favor regional coordination as a way to create local economic development
opportunities.
There has been relatively little research on the effects of different annexation and incorporation laws
on annexation and incorporation activity. The most recent research on the law and annexation activity
seems to indicate that easy laws contribute to high annexation activity and difficult laws retard
annexation activity, though this is far from a resolved issue. Research on the law and incorporation
activity is even weaker. Most studies have been for only one state (California) and the only multistate
study seems to indicate that annexation laws are a bigger factor than incorporation laws (easy
annexation laws lead to "defensive" incorporations).
Politically, city-county consolidations, the most sweeping kind of local government reform, continue to
be unpopular (only 17 out of 68 passed over the 1945-1976 period). Most of the votes have been in
the South, where racism has been considered a motivating factor to dilute central city voting power of
African-Americans. The courts have made consolidation votes even more difficult to pass, requiring
that a majority pass in both cities and counties and that the Fair Housing Act not be violated. The
number of annexations achieved and the number of regional councils of government
25created have increased, although these actions are considered less sweeping in their reforms than city-
county consolidations.
2-Directions for Future Research. Some of the issues mentioned above have been researched rather
thoroughly. We find that there are three major issues regarding the optimal size of local government
that have not received enough attention. One issue is the quality of service delivery. It appears to be
the case, at least anecdotally, that taxes or expenditures do not go down after consolidations because
local governments use the savings to improve the quality of existing services. This hypothesis has not
been rigorously tested. A second issue is the general neglect of rural and small city issues. Most of
the literature we located addresses metropolitan issues, yet there are interesting and unanswered
questions regarding rural areas. Thirdly, the research on the law’s effect on annexation and
incorporation is largely unresolved. We would like to see more studies using a nationwide database
confirm or refute the few studies that exist today.
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35Table 1 - Summary of Selected Data on Boundary Changes for Municipalities
of 2,500 or More Population, by State: 1980-1989
Annexations Detachments
Population Square Population Square
Number (000) Miles Number (000) Miles
Alabama 4,051 117 676 89 2 13
Alaska 95 3 148 1 1 16
Arizona 792 94 912 21 1 6
Arkansas 1,064 77 239 5 1 3
California 5,101 283 726 148 1 13
Colorado 2,616 44 429 39 24 18
Connecticut 111000
Delaware 155 29000
Florida 5,961 152 414 64 2 7
Georgia 5,636 58 282 34 1 6
Hawaii 000000
Idaho 545 15 41 22 1 1
Illinois 9,560 88 289 117 1 4
Indiana 1,326 58 93 19 2 2
Iowa 757 9 63 27 1 2
Kansas 1,754 23 134 44 2 5
Kentucky 947 52 124 20 1 6
Louisiana 1,319 74 126 13 1 2
Maine 000000
Maryland 485 9 44 6 1 1
Massachusetts 000000
Michigan 709 25 64 21 1 3
Minnesota 1,003 12 56 78 1 5
Mississippi 132 50 111 5 1 2
Missouri 36 20 33 1 1
Montana 619 14 24 22 1 1
Nebraska 637 61 40 30 1 1
Nevada 490 4 81 2 0 1
New Hampshire 000000
New Jersey 911311
New Mexico 554 18 121 1 0 1
New York 202 2 18 7 1 1
North Carolina 4,577 313 460 11 1 1
North Dakota 288 8 21 16 1 2
Ohio 1,882 35 160 29 1 4
Oklahoma 1,546 34 342 166 13 279
Oregon 1,711 110 95 13 1 1
Pennsylvania 18 11611
Rhode Island 000000
South Carolina 3,343 66 193 11 1 4
South Dakota 340 9 31 7 1 1
Tennessee 1,770 91 318 25 1 2
Texas 5,730 360 1,010 399 6 162
Utah 966 21 211 34 1 17
Vermont 111201
Virginia 79 45 118 8 1 1
Washington 1,355 67 134 4 1 1
West Virginia 250 9 36 2 1 1
Wisconsin 2,342 17 112 50 1 5
Wyoming 642 14 55 2 1 1
UNITED STATES 75,337 2,583 8,684 1,656 84 606
Source: Unpublished, unofficial update of U.S. Census Bureau, Annexation and Boundary Survey, 1983. The U.S. Census
Bureau no longer publishes this survey, even though the data are collected for other internal purposes. These data were
obtained by direct request to the Bureau’s Geography Division. The authors are grateful to the Bureau for providing us
with these data.
9Table 2 - Categories of States by Legislative Annexation Models
Quasi-
Judicial Legislative Municipal Popular Legislative
Determination Determination Determination Determination Determination
Mississippi Connecticut Idaho Alabama Alaska
Pennsylvania Delaware Indiana Arizona Arkansas
Virginia Hawaii Missouri Colorado California
Maine Nebraska Florida Iowa
Massachusetts N. Carolina Georgia Kansas
New Hampshire Oklahoma Illinois Minnesota
Rhode Island Tennessee Kentucky New Mexico














Source: Liner (1990), p. 84.
20Table 3 - City-County Consolidation Votes, 1945 - 1976
Plans that were adopted Plans that were rejected
Year Percent City-County Year Percent City-County
1947 51.1 Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, LA 1948 45.4 Miami-Dade County, FL
1952 88.7 Hampton-Elizabeth County, VA 1954 33.0 Albany-Dougherty County, GA
1957 51.0 Miami-Dade County, FL 1957 49.2 Miami-Dade County, FL
1957 66.9 Newport News-Warwick, VA 1958 47.3 Nashville-Davidson County, TN
1962 56.8 Nashville-Davidson County, TN 1959 30.0 Albuquerque-Bernalillo County, NM
1962 66.0 South Norfolk-Norfold County, VA 1959 44.8 Cleveland-Cuyahoga County, OH
1962 81.9 Virginia Beach-Princess Anne County, VA 1959 16.7 Knoxville-Knox County, TN
1967 64.7 Jacksonville-Duval County, FL 1959 27.5 St. Louis-St. Louis County, MO
1969 65.1 Carson City-Ornsby County, NV 1960 35.8 Macon-Bibb County, GA
1969 54.1 Juneau-Greater Juneau Borough, AK 1961 22.3 Durham-Durham County, NC
1970 80.7 Columbus-Muscogee County, VA 1961 54.0 Richmond-Henrico County, VA
1971 77.2 Sitka-Greater Sitka Borough 1962 42.1 Columbus-Muscogee County, GA
1972 69.4 Lexington-Fayette County, KY 1962 36.8 Memphis-Shelby County, TN
1972 75.7 Suffolk-Nansemond County, VA 1962 40.1 St. Louis-St. Louis County, MO
1975 60.2 Anchorage, Glen Alps, Gerwood- 1964 19.2 Chattanooga-Hamilton County, TN
Greater Anchorage Borough, AK 1967 28.4 Tampa-Hillsborough County, FL
1976 56.0 Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, MT 1969 48.0 Athens-Clarke County, GA
1976 62.0 Butte-Silver Bow County, MT 1969 29.6 Brunswick-Glynn County, GA
1969 66.4 Roanoke-Roanoke County, GA
1969 31.9 Winchester-Frederick County, VA
1970 28.1 Charlottesville-Albemarle County, V
1970 48.0 Chattanooga-Hamilton County, TN
1970 42.0 Pensacola-Escambra County, FL
1970 42.0 Tampa-Hillsborough County, FL
1971 41.5 Augusta-Richmond County, GA
1971 17.5 Bristol-Washington County, VA
1971 30.5 Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, NC
1971 47.6 Memphis-Shelby County, TN
1971 41.0 Tallahassee-Leon County, FL
1972 48.3 Athens-Clarke County, GA
1972 36.5 Fort Pierce-St. Lucie County, FL
1972 39.6 Macon-Bibb County, GA
1972 42.0 Tampa-Hillsborough County, FL
1973 44.1 Albuquerque-Bernalillo County, NM
1973 45.9 Columbia-Richland County, SC
1973 58.3 Savannah-Chatham County, GA
1973 45.9 Tallahassee-Leon County, FL
1973 25.6 Wilmington-New Hanover County, NC
1974 51.5 Augusta-Richmond County, GA
1974 40.4 Charleston-Charleston County, SC
1974 32.1 Durham-Durham County, NC
1974 26.1 Evansville-Vanderburgh County, IN
1974 27.5 Portland-Multnomah County, OR
1974 24.9 Sacramento-Sacramento County, CA
1975 16.7 Ashland-Catlesttsburg-Boyd County,
1975 39.0 Salt Lake City-Salt Lake County, UT
1976 45.5 Augusta-Richmond County, GA
1976 38.0 Macon-Bibb County, GA
1976 46.0 Missoula-Missoula County, MT
1976 21.0 Moab-Grand County, UT
1976 45.1 Tallahassee-Leon County, FL
Source: Marando (1979), pp. 412-413.
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